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We hypothesize that retail and service business units will enjoy reduced failure rates if afﬁliated withexperienced multiunit owners and franchisors. Experience of individual owners and franchisees should
result in knowledge that is tacit and idiosyncratic and thus primarily of value locally. Because franchisors
typically codify knowledge gained from experience, we argue that units should beneﬁt from both local and
distant experience of their franchisor. Using Texan pizza restaurant failure data, we found that the units of
all multiunit owners, franchised or not, beneﬁted from their owner’s local congenital experience, but not from
distantly gained experience. Further, the franchisor’s local experience reduced failure rates. Contrary to one
hypothesis, franchisors’ distant experience did not prove beneﬁcial. In addition, a complementary effect was
found for owner and franchisor congenital experience. These results highlight the continued importance of local
experience, even among the most codiﬁed and standardized business organizations.
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1. Introduction
Retail and service business units afﬁliated with chains
via direct ownership and/or via a contractual rela-
tionship with a franchisor have become dominant
in the U.S. economy. According to the 1972 U.S.
Economic Census, retail units afﬁliated with a chain
in the form of a multiunit owner (i.e., a ﬁrm that owns
and operates units at multiple geographic locations)
generated 44% ($202 billion) of total retail sales. By
1997, multiunit ﬁrms generated 62% ($1,528 billion) of
total retail sales. Further, in 1995, the units afﬁliated
with chains via a franchising relationship generated
more than $800 billion in retail and service sales in
the United States, more than 12% of the nation’s gross
domestic product (International Franchise Association
1996). Practitioner and academic observers have long
attributed the dominance of the retail and service sec-
tors by chains to two beneﬁts that units gain from
afﬁliation: the use of a reputable brand name and
access to knowledge gained from the chain’s expe-
rience (see, e.g., Luxenberg 1985, Love 1986, Ingram
1996). Academic research has conﬁrmed that units
are less likely to fail as their chains gain experi-
ence (Ingram and Baum 1997, Greve 1999). We build
on this work by disentangling the unit-level failure-
reducing beneﬁts of owner and franchisor experience.
Further, many units are afﬁliated with both a fran-
chisor and a multiunit owner. We examine whether
a unit’s simultaneous access to the two sources of
experience and knowledge yields unique beneﬁts
unavailable to units afﬁliated only with a franchisor
or a multiunit owner.
The distinction between the experience gained by
franchisors and owners is of theoretical importance
because the knowledge that results from the two
types of chain afﬁliation may be very different:
Franchisors typically codify knowledge and distribute
standardized routines to franchisees (Bradach 1997,
1998; Knott 2001, 2003), while individual owners and
employees are more likely to serve as repositories
for tacit knowledge (Argote and Darr 2001) and for
knowledge that is idiosyncratic to a local market
(Bradach 1998, p. 45). Nonaka (1994) proposed a com-
plementary relationship between codiﬁed and tacit
knowledge, providing a theoretical basis for the possi-
bility that units afﬁliated with both a franchisor and a
multiunit owner may be the least likely to fail because
of their access to both types of knowledge.
Our second contribution is that we propose and
test hypotheses that unit-level failure-reducing bene-
ﬁts of the franchisor’s and multiunit owner’s experi-
ence depend on whether that experience was gained
locally or distantly from the unit in question. Existing
work has hypothesized and found that units bene-
ﬁt most from experience gained by the chain locally;
nonlocal experience has even been found to be harm-
ful (Ingram and Baum 1997, Greve 1999). Our con-
tribution beyond those of the existing work is the
insight that the codiﬁed and tacit natures of the fran-
chisors’ and owners’ knowledge, respectively, suggest
1716
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that distance should moderate differently the failure-
reducing beneﬁts of the two types of knowledge. To
build our hypotheses, we draw on previous work
suggesting that tacit knowledge is particularly likely
to be bounded by distance (Maskell and Malmberg
1999, von Krogh et al. 2000) and that standardiza-
tion of routines greatly facilitates the transfer of oper-
ational knowledge across distance (Adler and Cole
1993, Argote et al. 1990).
We focus on a unit’s congenital experience—that is,
the experience of the franchisor and the owner at the
time of the unit’s founding (see, e.g., Huber 1991)—
rather than ongoing operating experience, because
franchising practitioners consistently emphasize the
crucial nature of the decisions that need to be made
before a unit’s startup. For example, Bradach (1998,
p. 19) quoted a franchisor development executive as
saying, “If you make a mistake at the beginning, it
doesn’t matter how well you run the unit, because
it won’t make any money.” Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the franchisors and owners use their experi-
ence to identify appropriate sites for their new units.
The site-selection decision is irreversible and has been
argued by practitioner guides to be the most cru-
cial determinant of success for retail and service units
(Salvaneschi 1996).
The setting in which our hypotheses are tested is
the pizza restaurant industry in Texas between 1990
and 1999. Throughout this period, the industry land-
scape included units afﬁliated with multiunit owners,
franchisors, neither, and both. Substantial unit-level
turnover has occurred in this 10-year period, allowing
us to meaningfully analyze the likelihood of failure
based on the afﬁliations and experience levels associ-
ated with each unit. Pizza restaurants are a particu-
larly appropriate industry for a study of knowledge
transfer across geographically separate units because
substantial innovation, both codiﬁable and tacit, has
been documented to occur at the unit level, as has the
transfer of that innovation (e.g., Darr et al. 1995, Darr
and Kurtzberg 2000, Argote and Darr 2001).
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. We begin with a literature review regarding
beneﬁts of owner afﬁliation and franchisor afﬁlia-
tion. The franchising relationship is also described. In
§3, we develop hypotheses regarding failure-reducing
beneﬁts of local and distantly accumulated congeni-
tal experience of owners and franchisors. In §4, we
describe the Texas pizzeria data, deﬁne our variables,
and describe the event history method. In §5, we
present our core results and describe robustness tests
and caveats. Section 5 also contains a supplementary
analysis. We analyze separately the failure rates of
two groups of franchisor-afﬁliated units: franchised
units and company-owned units of the franchisors.
The typical discussion and conclusion sections close
the paper.
2. Background
2.1. Afﬁliation of Units with Multiunit Owners
and Franchisors
Afﬁliation of multiple operating sites via ownership
has been considered superior to market-based rela-
tions between sites for the purpose of transferring
knowledge and routines from one location to another
(Kogut and Zander 1992) and for coordinating and
integrating activities across locations (Chandler 1977,
p. 235). Consistent with these beneﬁts, Ingram and
Baum (1997) found that hotels afﬁliated with chains,
mostly in the form of multiunit owners, had lower
failure rates than unafﬁliated hotels did. Baum (1999)
found that nursing homes afﬁliated with multiunit
owners also enjoyed lower failure rates than did the
nursing homes of single-unit owners.
The knowledge transfer literature has found that
“similar other” units learn from each other even if
separately owned and operated. This result has been
demonstrated for hospitals (Byrd 2001), Israeli kib-
butzim (Ingram and Simons 2002), and franchised
pizza restaurants (Darr and Kurtzberg 2000). Relat-
edly, afﬁliation with a chain via franchising has been
shown to have performance beneﬁts for individual
units (Knott and McKelvey 1999, Litz and Stewart
1998). While knowledge often does not get transferred
directly from franchisee to franchisee (Darr et al.
1995), transfer does take place with the franchisor
as an intermediary. Argote (1999, p. 91) described
a “two-stage” process of knowledge dissemination
among franchised units (see also Luxenberg 1985,
p. 19). Knowledge that arose from franchisee expe-
rience ﬁrst disseminated directly to the other stores
of the same franchisee but only later was trans-
ferred by the franchisor—after codiﬁcation by the
franchisor—on a broader scale to other franchisees
and to company-owned units.
2.2. Franchisors and Standardization
The franchising relationship is a contractual one
between a franchisor and a franchisee, who owns and
operates one or more units (e.g., restaurants, hotels)
of the franchisor’s brand. Legally, the franchisor and
the franchisee are separate business entities. The fran-
chisee pays an upfront fee along with an ongoing
annual sales royalty to the franchisor for the oper-
ating rights. The franchisee keeps the residual proﬁt
after paying the royalty and expenses associated with
operating the unit(s). When a franchisor decides that a
new unit should be built in an area, it chooses among
the existing franchisees to operate the unit, selects a
new franchisee, or owns the unit itself. If a franchisee
is chosen, the franchisor works with the franchisee to
select the best actual location for the unit (Kalnins and
Lafontaine 2004).
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Franchisors typically display an intense commit-
ment to standardizing routines and services across
afﬁliated units (Bradach 1998, pp. 84–111, Knott 2001).
McDonald’s standardized every aspect of operations,
including food preparation, customer service, and
cost control (Love 1986, pp. 140–142). Franchisors
have an incentive to standardize that multiunit own-
ers do not have, because their franchisees may free-
ride on the franchisor’s brand reputation. Unlike
managers at units afﬁliated with only multiunit own-
ers, franchisees have incentives to provide lower-
quality services (Brickley 1999). Franchisors monitor
their franchisees to mitigate such free-riding, but
without standardization, monitoring becomes very
difﬁcult (Kaufmann 1989). Some chains of multiunit
owners may, of course, standardize without any fran-
chisor involvement. Hotels afﬁliated with some multi-
unit owners standardized their accounting systems,
for example (Ingram 1996, pp. 58–62). However, Jakle
and Sculle (1999, 110–112) presented anecdotes that
multiunit owners unafﬁliated with franchisors often
do not even attempt to standardize products or rou-
tines across units and have difﬁculty surviving as a
result. Thus, overall, we expect franchisors to stan-
dardize more than multiunit owners unafﬁliated with
a franchisor would.
3. Development of Hypotheses
3.1. Congenital Experience for Units Afﬁliated
with Multiunit Owners
The organizational learning literature has long
focused on the relationship of experience and perfor-
mance (see, e.g., Argote 1999, pp. 1–28, for a review).
Consistent with previous work (Ingram and Baum
1997, Greve 1999), we argue that a unit’s congenital
experience is most valuable when gained by the
multiunit owner in an area local to the unit. Local
experience leads to an understanding of idiosyn-
crasies regarding appropriate and inappropriate sites
for a possible new unit. For example, after accumu-
lating experience in an area, an owner may have
learned how to gather information about future pub-
lic projects that would make particular sites valu-
able or worthless. For example, the knowledge that a
trafﬁc island was to be constructed on a busy high-
way, separating the lanes and blocking access to retail
units from one direction, was valuable knowledge
that made a franchisee avoid that particular stretch of
highway (Bradach 1998, p. 19). Further, because much
owner and employee knowledge is tacit (Argote and
Darr 2000), proximity may aid its transfer (Maskell
and Malmberg 1999; von Krogh et al. 2000, pp. 75,
83–84, 92). Managers of nearby units afﬁliated with
the same multiunit owner are more likely to meet
face to face repeatedly than those separated by a
greater distance, resulting in the transfer of tacit
knowledge that may aid site selection as well as unit
management.
In contrast to local congenital experience, experi-
ence gained by a multiunit owner distantly from a
particular unit may be harmful for the unit because
the resulting tacit knowledge may be inappropriate
(Ingram and Baum 1997, Greve 1999). Multiunit fran-
chisees and owners not afﬁliated with franchisors typ-
ically own clusters of units in one geographical area
(Kalnins and Lafontaine 2004, Baum et al. 2000). The
tacit knowledge gained by the owner from units in the
cluster may well be inappropriate for the occasional
unit outside the cluster, where tastes, demographics,
and the nature of competition may be different. Fur-
ther, distance has been shown to inhibit transfer of
knowledge between subsidiaries of the same ﬁrm
(Adams and Jaffe 1996), implying that even if the
distantly gained knowledge were appropriate, it may
never reach other units located far from the unit
where the knowledge was ﬁrst developed.
We expect similar beneﬁcial effects of locally gained
congenital experience of a unit’s owner and simi-
lar detrimental effects of distant experience for all
units, whether or not they are afﬁliated with fran-
chisors. Therefore, we state only two hypotheses, each
of which is tested separately for franchisor-afﬁliated
and unafﬁliated units:
Hypothesis 1a. The likelihood of a unit’s failure will
decrease with that unit’s congenital experience gained
locally by its owner.
Hypothesis 1b. The likelihood of a unit’s failure will
increase with that unit’s congenital experience gained dis-
tantly by its owner.
3.2. Congenital Experience for Units Afﬁliated
with Franchisors
Units afﬁliated with franchisors should beneﬁt from
congenital experience acquired by other owners afﬁl-
iated with the same franchisor. As mentioned above,
Argote (1999) stated that the franchisor transfers
knowledge created at franchised units to other fran-
chisees, whose units may be located very far from
the innovating unit. The franchisor codiﬁes and stan-
dardizes this knowledge before disseminating it to
franchisees (Love 1986, p. 140; Bradach 1998, p. 45;
Knott 2001, 2003). In the role of the “standardizer,”
the franchisor typically ﬁlters out knowledge and
routines that are idiosyncratic to speciﬁc markets
(Bradach 1998, pp. 118–119). The knowledge and rou-
tines ﬁltered out are exactly those that may help
multiunit owners locally but hurt them at distant
locations. As a result, the knowledge provided by
the franchisor will not be perfect for any one loca-
tion, but should be generic enough to be valuable
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to franchisees at most locations, as long as the fran-
chisor has had some previous experience in areas
with similar demographics. Consistent with the idea
that franchisors’ codiﬁed knowledge retains its value
across diverse markets, Knott (2001) found that, over
time, ex-franchisees abandoned many routines put in
place by their franchisor when they left the chain.
While these ex-franchisees believed the routines they
were abandoning were “not of value in our market”
(p. 443), their performance consistently went down as
they abandoned them.
Equally importantly, codiﬁcation and standardiza-
tion facilitate the knowledge transfer between geo-
graphically dispersed units (Adler and Cole 1993,
Argote et al. 1990, Zander and Kogut 1995). For these
reasons, unlike the case of multiunit owners’ experi-
ence, we should expect the experience of other own-
ers afﬁliated with the franchisor to be beneﬁcial to
a unit when that experience has been accumulated
either locally or distantly.
Hypothesis 2a. For units afﬁliated with franchisors,
the likelihood of a unit’s failure will decrease with that
unit’s congenital experience gained locally by its franchisor.
Hypothesis 2b. For units afﬁliated with franchisors,
the likelihood of a unit’s failure will decrease with
that unit’s congenital experience gained distantly by its
franchisor.
3.3. The Complementarity of the Franchisor’s and
Owner’s Congenital Experience
The interaction of the two forms of chain afﬁliation on
a unit’s performance and—more generally—the inter-
action of codiﬁed and tacit knowledge has remained
largely unexplored. In one existing study that sug-
gests a complementary role, Bates (1998) found that
new units afﬁliated with franchisors that were also
afﬁliated with a multiunit owner survived longer.
Nonaka (1994) suggested a complementary effect
of codiﬁed and tacit knowledge, arguing that both
are needed within an organization for knowledge cre-
ation to take place. We apply this intuition to the case
of franchising by arguing that the codiﬁed knowledge
of the franchisor should complement the tacit knowl-
edge of the franchisees. Practitioner statements illus-
trate the complementary effects of the franchisor’s
and franchisees’ congenital experience on improving
site selection and thus reducing a unit’s likelihood
of failure. An experienced multiunit franchisee stated
that, when searching for sites, the franchisor’s man-
agers consistently “remind us of a lot of things we
overlook” (Bradach 1998, p. 33). In turn, a franchisor
representative stated that, when selecting sites, exist-
ing franchisees “know the local conditions, and we
rely on this” (Bradach 1998, p. 71).
We also make a related argument that is an appli-
cation of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal
1990). This supports the notion that “the ability to
evaluate and utilize outside knowledge is largely a
function of prior related knowledge” (p. 128). Results
suggestive of a localized form of absorptive capacity
have been found in the innovation literature. Patents,
a form of “outside” knowledge that is clearly codiﬁed,
have consistently been found to be cited primarily in
a geographic area local to their origin (e.g., Jaffe et al.
1993, Almeida and Kogut 1997, Jaffe and Trajtenberg
1999), suggesting that prior and related knowledge
that is local and tacit is crucial in enabling scientists
to learn from the innovations of their peers.
Our case is similar. The outside knowledge is the
codiﬁed knowledge provided by the franchisor, while
the prior related knowledge is the tacit knowledge
that multiunit owners develop locally via their own
experience.
Hypothesis 3. For units afﬁliated with franchisors, the
likelihood of failure will decrease with the combination
of the owner’s local congenital experience and the local
congenital experience of other owners afﬁliated with the
franchisor.
4. Empirical Research Design
4.1. Data
We analyze data provided by the Texas Comptroller’s
Ofﬁce from their Sales and Use Tax Permit File, which
includes all pizza restaurants in Texas operating at
any time in the 1990s. We are conﬁdent that the data
are complete, because every restaurant must provide
location and ownership information to pay sales tax.
The data provide a unit’s name, opening date (and
failure date, if applicable), street address, owner’s
name, and headquarters location. No information is
available for restaurants that failed before 1990, or for
any restaurants outside Texas.
The pizza restaurant industry consists of an inter-
esting combination of units afﬁliated with franchisors,
multiunit owners, both, and neither. Of the 2,474
pizza restaurants in existence in Texas at the end
of 1999, there were 1,670 afﬁliated with multiunit
owners and 804 afﬁliated with single-unit owners;
1,650 were afﬁliated with franchisors and 824 were
unafﬁliated with franchisors. Of the 804 units that
had single-unit owners, 213 were afﬁliated with fran-
chisors and 591 were not. By deﬁnition, these single-
unit ﬁrms had no congenital owner experience. Pizza
restaurant franchisor afﬁliation was determined by
comparing the business names with the comprehen-
sive sets of chains listed in the Franchise Opportunities
Guide trade publications in the 1990s (International
Franchise Association 1991–1999).
In 1999, Pizza Hut was the largest franchisor in
Texas, with 564 units. Domino’s was the second
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largest, with 311 units. The major pizza franchisors
operate only one branded pizza chain each. Tricon
owned Pizza Hut (though it also owns KFC and
Taco Bell), while Domino’s and Little Caesar’s and
the other smaller franchisors were stand-alone cor-
porations. No Pizza Hut owners in our population
also owned Taco Bells or KFC units. There were no
cases of individual owners owning units afﬁliated
with multiple franchisors, but 16 owners owned both
franchisor-afﬁliated and unafﬁliated units.
4.2. Method
We tested our hypotheses using event history analy-
sis. Speciﬁcally, we used parametric hazard models,
which require that a functional form for the transition
rates be speciﬁed. We estimated regressions using the
exponential, Gompertz, and Weibull forms. Because
our theory and hypotheses concern only the covari-
ates, and because the results for the covariates did
not differ regardless of the model used, we chose to
present results using the simple exponential model.
The exponential form assumes that the instantaneous
transition from origin state (active unit) to destination
state (unit failure) at time t does not depend on time t,
but depends only on the covariates. The general form
of the model is rt= exp′X, where r is the instan-
taneous transition or “hazard” rate, X is a vector of
covariates, and  is the vector of coefﬁcients.
Because the values of all our covariates of theoreti-
cal interest change over time, we split the life histories
of all units into one-year spells and, for each spell,
set all covariates to their values at the beginning of
that year (see, e.g., Ingram and Baum 1997, Baum and
Ingram 1998). The parameters were then estimated by
the method of maximum likelihood.
Many pizza restaurants in our sample were
founded before 1990. Fortunately, the Texas data set
contains founding dates, even if those are before 1990.
Therefore, the event history model will only analyze
a unit founded in 1980 with others that have survived
until the 10th year. The unit will never be mistaken
for a new entrant, and problems of left censoring are
avoided. See Stata Corp (2001, pp. 441–446) for an
extensive discussion on this issue.
4.3. Variable Deﬁnitions
The dependent variable is the transition rate between
active units and their failure. To determine this rate,
two statistics are required: the length of time a pizza
restaurant has stayed in business and whether the
unit is still in business as of December 31, 1999 (i.e.,
whether it is right censored). The length of time is
calculated by subtracting the founding date (or acqui-
sition date by the current owner) from the exit date (if
closed) or from December 31, 1999, if the unit is still
open for business at that time. Units were considered
failures only if they had closed down. Franchisor-
afﬁliated units that became unafﬁliated or vice versa
were not considered failures.
We measured congenital experience in a manner
identical to the existing literature on failure rates
within chains (e.g., Ingram and Baum 1997, Baum and
Ingram 1998). Like those papers, we calculate
CongExpTij =
Tifound∑
t=Tj found
Ntj
DiscountT−t

The congenital experience at time T (the period
associated with each spell) for unit i afﬁliated with
chain j (the franchisor or multiunit owner) is a
summation across all time periods between Tj found,
which is the founding date (or acquisition date) by j
for the very ﬁrst unit afﬁliated with j , and Tifound,
which is the founding date (or acquisition date) by j
for unit i. Ntj , the count of units afﬁliated with j at
time t, is divided by a discount factor to capture the
decay in the value of experience over time. The result-
ing value is summed across all time periods t.
The experience is discounted based on the length
of time between its occurrence and the current spell;
congenital experience should matter less after a unit
operates for 10 years than it does at founding. In
line with prior research, we estimated regressions
using the following values of Discount:
√
T − t T − t,
T − t2, and 1 (no discount). The factor of T − t2
indicates the fastest depreciation of the value of expe-
rience. The square root discount factor is used in the
regressions below because it represents a gradual but
nonetheless substantial decay in the organization’s
knowledge. Estimations using other discount factors
are discussed as robustness tests.
For each unit afﬁliated with a franchisor, sepa-
rate levels of congenital experience are calculated for
the owner of that unit and for its franchisor. The
Same Franchisor, Other Owners’ Congenital Experi-
ence variables include experience gained at the units
of other franchisees afﬁliated with the same fran-
chisor and at company-owned units of that fran-
chisor. For a unit company owned by a franchisor,
the Same Franchisor, Other Owners’ Congenital Expe-
rience variables include experience gained only at
the units of franchisees afﬁliated with the same fran-
chisor. In this case, the experience gained at other
company-owned units of the franchisor is included in
the Same Owner’s Congenital Experience variables.
To distinguish local from distant experience, the
congenital experience was considered to be local only
if it occurred within the closest 25 units. In other
words, we only added an owner’s or franchisor’s
existing units to their respective Ntj count if they were
within the closest 25 units from unit i. Similarly, units
were only added to the Ntj for distant experience if
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they were outside the closest 25 units (but within
Texas). Other ordinal ranges of distance (e.g., the clos-
est 50 or 100 units) as well as the use of administra-
tive boundaries (e.g., counties, zips) were considered
as the basis for the operationalization of “local”; these
are discussed in the robustness tests section.
In addition to these variables of theoretical inter-
est, we include control variables for the sizes (num-
ber of afﬁliated units) of the chains of franchisors and
multiunit owners. These control variables are crucial
because size and congenital experience are typically
correlated between 0.4 and 0.6. To measure the size
of a multiunit owner’s chain, we counted the num-
ber of units that were open during each spell. These
are also split into local and distant groups based on
whether they are among the closest 25 units from the
unit under observation.
Several other control variables are included. Binary
variables are included to identify units that are com-
pany owned by franchisors and to identify units that
are acquired. Zip code–level counts of local competi-
tors are included to capture the potential effects of
competition and/or agglomeration beneﬁts on failure.
The count is broken down into units afﬁliated with
other franchisors and unafﬁliated units. As a general
measure of market size, we include zip code residen-
tial population. Per capita income of each zip code
(from the 1990 census) is included to control for lucra-
tive markets. The net addition (entries minus exits)
of total retail units in the two years previous to the
year of each spell is included to control for economic
growth.
We also include dummy variables to allow the haz-
ard rates to vary with unit age within the exponential
framework. Separate intercepts are included for the
ﬁrst year of a unit’s existence, the second year, the
third through ﬁfth years, and the sixth through tenth
years. Separate intercepts are also included for each
calendar year to control for economic shocks. Finally,
intercepts are included for each of the 18 franchisors
active in Texas. As the franchisors vary in size and
level of experience, we do not wish to confound het-
erogeneity in franchisor quality with the actual effect
of the experience; franchisors that have higher-quality
brands should eventually be larger and have more
experience as a result.
Descriptive statistics for each of the two subpop-
ulations are presented in Table 1. The subpopula-
tions are based on whether the restaurant is afﬁli-
ated with a franchisor (used to test Hypotheses 1a,
1b, 2a, 2b, and 3) or is unafﬁliated with a franchisor
(Hypotheses 1a and 1b only). There were 2,369 units
total at some point afﬁliated with franchisors and
1,788 at some point unafﬁliated. While the vast major-
ity was either always afﬁliated with a franchisor or
always unafﬁliated, 107 were at some point afﬁli-
ated and at some point unafﬁliated. Spells from these
107 units appear in the appropriate subsample based
on the unit’s afﬁliation status in that spell.
5. Results
5.1. Core Results
Table 2 displays results from nine separate exponen-
tial hazard models that analyze the effects of con-
genital experience on failure. Models 1–6 analyze
franchisor-afﬁliated units. The ﬁrst three models test
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b. The next three include
interaction terms to test Hypothesis 3. To minimize
the correlation between the primary and interaction
terms, we mean-centered the experience and unit
count variables when calculating the interaction terms
(Aiken and West 1991). Models 7–9 test Hypotheses 1a
and 1b for units not afﬁliated with franchisors.
Three models are included for each test because of
the moderately high correlations (0.3 to 0.6) between
local congenital experience and local number of afﬁl-
iated units and between local congenital experience
and distant congenital experience. The correlations
are sufﬁciently high that the signiﬁcance of effects
may arise only when both of the correlated vari-
ables are included. Therefore, we include regres-
sions with the local congenital experience variables
together with the distant experience variables and
the unit count variables (Models 1 and 7), with dis-
tant experience but without the unit counts (Models 2
and 8), and alone (Models 3 and 9). We only claim
that a hypothesis is fully supported if signiﬁcance
remains across all three models for each owner type
(e.g., Models 1, 2, and 3). If signiﬁcance remains
with and without the correlated variables, we can be
sure that high correlations are not causing spurious
signiﬁcance.
Before discussing the results regarding each
hypothesis, we note the signiﬁcantly lower fail-
ure rates of units afﬁliated with franchisors. Only
710 units among the 2,369 units afﬁliated with fran-
chisors failed (29.9%), while 968 of the 1,788 unafﬁli-
ated units failed (53.8%).
The signiﬁcant and negative coefﬁcients of the
Same Owner’s Local Congenital Experience variable
in Models 1–3 indicate that Hypothesis 1a is sup-
ported for franchisor-afﬁliated units. The signiﬁcance
in all three models assures us of robust support for
the notion that the likelihood of failure decreases
with the local congenital experience of the owner.
Only in Model 1 is the positive coefﬁcient of the
Same Owner’s Distant Congenital Experience vari-
able signiﬁcant, and then only marginally so. To be
conservative, we conclude that Hypothesis 1b is not
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Table 2 Exponential Hazard Models: Dependent Variable Is Unit-Level Failure
Afﬁliated with franchisor 710 failures/2,369 total establishments
Unafﬁliated with franchisor
Without interaction term With interaction term 962 failures/1,788 total establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Same Owner’s Local −0045∗∗ −0059∗∗ −0052∗∗ −0055∗∗ −0074∗∗ −0066∗∗ −0092∗∗ −0047+ −0053∗
Congenital Experience 0013 0013 0012 0015 0016 0015 0032 0027 0027
Same Owner’s Distant 0020 0023+ 0021 0026+ 0007 −1079
Congenital Experience 0016 0014 0016 0014 0011 0869
Same Franchisor/Other Owners’ −0050∗∗ −0018∗ −0016∗ −0067∗∗ −0044∗∗ −0040∗∗
Local Congenital Experience 0010 0009 0008 0015 0015 0014
Same Franchisor/Other Owners’ 0019+ 0002 0018+ 0002
Distant Congenital Experience 0010 0009 0010 0009
Franchisor’s×Owner’s Local −0006∗ −0009∗ −0008∗
Congenital Experience 0003 0004 0004
Same Owner’s Local Units −0050+ −0050+ 0239∗∗
0031 0031 0075
Same Owner’s Distant Units 0158 0125 −0008∗
0187 0187 0004
Same Franchisor/Other 0223∗∗ 0200∗∗
Owners’ Local Units 0027 0032
Same Franchisor/Other −0024 −0050
Owners’ Distant Units 0178 0179
Franchisor’s×Owner’s Local −0019
Units 0013
Company-Owned Unit 0658∗∗ 0625∗∗ 0679∗∗ 0665∗∗ 0625∗∗ 0688∗∗
0134 0107 0098 0134 0107 0098
Acquisition −0117 −0098 −0061 −0124 −0103 −0061 −0037 −0040 −0041
0096 0096 0091 0096 0096 0091 0085 0085 0085
Other Franchisors’ Afﬁliated 0070∗∗ 0058∗ 0059∗ 0071∗∗ 0058∗ 0059∗ −0025 −0024 −0026
Units in Zip 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0022 00210021
Other Units in Zip 0031 0016 0017 0034 0018 0019 0009 0005 0004
0030 0030 0030 0030 0030 0030 0023 0023 0023
Population of Zip −0008∗ −0009∗ −0009∗ −0008∗ −0009∗ −0009∗ 0000 0000 0000
0004 0004 0004 0004 0004 0004 0003 0003 0003
Per Capita Income of Zip −0003 −0004 −0004 −0004 −0004 −0004 0000 0000 −0001
0004 0004 0004 0004 0004 0004 0003 0003 0003
Retail Unit Growth in Zip −0003 −0003 −0003 −0003 −0003 −0003 0001 0000 0000
0002 0002 0002 0002 0002 0002 0002 0002 0002
Age 1 year −175∗∗ −175∗∗ −168∗∗ −177∗∗ −178∗∗ −170∗∗ −0389+ −0387+ −0400+
0521 0519 0515 0521 0519 0515 0236 0233 0233
Age 2 years 0231 0241 0304+ 0216 0221 0294+ 149∗∗ 149∗∗ 148∗∗
0179 0176 0169 0179 0177 0170 0147 0144 0144
Age 3–5 years 0062 0066 0114 0052 0056 0111 104∗∗ 104∗∗ 104∗∗
0131 0130 0126 0131 0130 0126 0140 0137 0137
Age 6–10 years −0027 −0056 −0023 −0032 −0058 −0020 0512∗∗ 0515∗∗ 0512∗∗
0107 0105 0104 0107 0105 0104 0144 0142 0142
Chi squared 8738 7979 7950 8811 8057 8019 5178 5060 5043
Notes. Positive coefﬁcients indicate higher probability of failure.
Two-tailed tests: +p < 010; ∗p < 005; ∗∗p < 001.
All regressions include separate intercepts for each franchisor and for each year.
supported, despite some marginal evidence that fail-
ure does increase with the distant congenital experi-
ence of the owner.
Models 7–9 in Table 2 examine units unafﬁli-
ated with any franchisor. Hypothesis 1a is robustly
supported because of the signiﬁcant and negative
coefﬁcients of the Same Owner’s Local Congenital
Experience variable in all three models. The Same
Owner’s Distant Congenital Experience variable is
never signiﬁcant, so Hypothesis 1b is not supported.
The signiﬁcant and negative coefﬁcients of the
Same Franchisor/Other Owners’ Local Congenital
Experience. variable in Models 1–3 indicate that
Hypothesis 2a is strongly supported. For franchisor-
afﬁliated units, the likelihood of failure decreases
with the local congenital experience of other own-
ers afﬁliated with the franchisor. The signiﬁcance
in all three models assures us of robust support
for Hypothesis 2a, because the variable is corre-
lated 0.53 with the Same Franchisor/Other Owners’
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Distant Congenital Experience variable and 0.56 with
Same Franchisor/Other Owners’ Distant Units. Only
in Model 5 is the positive coefﬁcient of the Same
Franchisor/Other Owners’ Distant Congenital Experi-
ence variable signiﬁcant, and then only marginally so.
To be conservative, we conclude that Hypothesis 2b is
not supported, despite some marginal evidence that
failure does increase with the distant congenital expe-
rience of the franchisor.
Models 4–6 test the interaction term associated
with Hypothesis 3. The Franchisor’s × Owner’s Local
Congenital Experience interaction term is signiﬁcant
and negative in all three models, robustly supporting
Hypothesis 3. Experience of a unit’s owner and expe-
rience of its franchisor act as complements in reducing
that unit’s probability of failure.
Turning to the results regarding control variables,
the Same Franchisor/Other Owners’ Local Units vari-
able is positive and signiﬁcant. We note that this
variable is robustly signiﬁcant for regressions (not
shown) that do not include any of the congenital
experience variables or the distant unit count vari-
ables (these are both highly correlated with the local
unit counts, and thus could be inﬂuencing its signif-
icance in Models 1 and 4). While beyond the scope
of this paper, this result suggests “encroachment,” the
habit of franchisors to saturate markets to the point
where units of the same brand become each other’s
primary competition (see, e.g., Blair and Lafontaine
2002, Kalnins 2004, for more on this). The one other
control variable that consistently shows signiﬁcance
is Other Franchisors’ Afﬁliated Units in Zip. Fran-
chised units are more likely to fail when higher counts
of units afﬁliated with other franchisors are in their
zip code, suggesting a competitive effect. This result
does not hold for unafﬁliated units, possibly because
they are more differentiated. This result implies that
the pizza restaurant industry is one where bene-
ﬁts from agglomeration economies do not outweigh
competition.
5.2. Robustness Tests
We conducted a variety of robustness tests in addition
to the regressions estimated in Table 2. As mentioned
above, we estimated Gompertz and Weibull models
with no changes in signiﬁcance levels for the variables
of theoretical interest.
We estimated experience using discount factors
other than the square root formulation used in
Table 2. A linear discount factor provided almost
identical results (only Hypothesis 3 was no longer
supported), while the extremes of a quadratic dis-
count factor and no discount factor provided almost
no signiﬁcant results for experience. This pattern is
identical to that found in previous work (Ingram and
Baum 1997, Baum and Ingram 1998), strongly sug-
gesting that experience depreciates approximately at
the gradual rate of the square root of time.
We also estimated regressions using different def-
initions of “local.” The results in Table 3 considered
the 25 closest units and their associated experience as
local. We also estimated regressions considering the
closest 50 and 100 as local. The owner’s local experi-
ence becomes insigniﬁcant for units unafﬁliated with
franchisors for the 50-unit deﬁnition. For all types
of afﬁliation, the owner’s local experience becomes
insigniﬁcant using a 100-unit deﬁnition. The experi-
ence of other owners afﬁliated with the same fran-
chisor remains signiﬁcant and important at 50 and
100 units. These tests illustrate the truly localized
nature of congenital experience.
We mentioned above that another approach to
determining “local” status is to determine whether
units are within the same administrative region, such
as a county or zip code. We estimated regressions
using these approaches, but found weaker signiﬁcant
effects for county and no signiﬁcance for zip code.
Counties likely yielded weaker systematic effects
because of their large variance in size. For example,
Harris County (home of Houston) was home to 428
pizzerias in 1999. Deaf Smith County only had two.
Zip code counts were useful as a control to estimate
a unit’s level of direct competition, but many units
in separate zip codes are close enough that we feel
they should be considered local (and more than 50%
of zip codes had three or fewer pizza restaurants in
1999). Thus, the lack of effects using zip codes is not
surprising.
Finally, we considered a form of similarity other
than geographic proximity. We considered whether
urban units would beneﬁt more from experience at
other urban units than at rural units, and symmet-
rically, whether rural units would beneﬁt the most
from other rural units. While evidence exists that sim-
ilarity in the urban/rural dimension plays a role in
the assignment of franchisees to units (Kalnins and
Lafontaine 2004), we found no results that similar
experience in this dimension was any more beneﬁcial
than dissimilar experience.
5.3. Supplementary Analysis: Separation of
Franchised and Company-Owned Units
Though included only as a control variable in Table 2,
we investigated in more detail the possible variance
in effects between units afﬁliated with a franchisor
via a contractual franchising relationship and those
owned by the franchisors themselves. Many units
were owned by the large franchisors in the 1990s.
Pizza Hut owned 254 units (45% of their total), while
Domino’s owned 72 units (23% of their total) in 1999.
Separate results for franchisee-owned and company-
owned units are presented in Table 3.
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Before discussing the effects of congenital expe-
rience, we note more generally the strikingly simi-
lar failure rates of franchised and company-owned
units. Between 1990 and 1999, there were 2,369 units
total afﬁliated with franchisors. We note that 320 of
these were at some point franchised and at some
point company-owned units. Some periods from these
320 units appear in the franchised subsample anal-
ysis and others appear in the company-owned unit
subsample analysis, depending on the unit’s status
in each period. Using these criteria, 445 failures took
place during spells of franchisee ownership among
the 1,725 units (25.8%) that were at least at some point
franchisee owned. Of 964 units (27.4%) that were at
some point company owned, 265 failed. These statis-
tics are of interest because academics have hypothe-
sized that company-owned units should be less likely
to fail because companies take the best locations
(Martin 1988) or more likely to fail because of agency
problems (Knott and McKelvey 1999).
We also note the similarity in coefﬁcient sizes for
the Same Owner’s Local Congenital Experience vari-
able for the franchisee- and company-owned units.
Further, we note that neither group has signiﬁcant
positive or negative effects from distantly gained con-
genital experience. At ﬁrst, the localized nature of the
beneﬁts of experience of company-owned unit oper-
ation appears surprising. After all, franchisors suc-
cessfully own units throughout their entire domain
of operations. However, their individual district man-
agers in charge of the company-owned units typically
have a span of control of six to eight units (Bradach
1998, p. 46), implying that any tacit knowledge gained
by these individuals is likely to transfer primarily to
all units they oversee. Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004)
found that, despite the presence of company-owned
units throughout the chain’s domain, the franchisors
largely choose to own new units in clusters, just like
their franchisees do, suggesting that the franchisor is
taking advantage of the localized knowledge of one
or more district managers in the region of the cluster.
Our second main observation from Table 3 is that
the Same Franchisor/Other Owners’ Local Congenital
Experience variable for the company-owned units is
insigniﬁcant, indicating that those units do not beneﬁt
from the local experience of nearby franchisees. Three
institutional facts may explain this. First, while dis-
trict managers have the same opportunities as fran-
chisees to accumulate tacit knowledge that would be
valuable for their units’ survival, they may have fewer
incentives to take action based on this knowledge
(Knott and McKelvey 1999). Company managers are
typically salaried, and it is rarely possible to structure
a contract to give them the high-powered incentives
that arise from unit ownership (Lutz 1995). Second,
because they are embedded in a hierarchy, company
managers are more likely than franchisees to make
decisions based on what their superiors want to hear
(Bradach 1998, pp. 44, 146). Third, the hierarchy often
constrains the managers’ ability to make decisions
based on local knowledge, even if it may result in
superior performance for their units (Lafontaine and
Bhattacharyya 1995). Our ﬁnding complements other
work that is consistent with these arguments. Yin and
Zajac (2004) found that company-owned pizza restau-
rants were less successful than franchisees at man-
aging complex strategies, such as the simultaneous
operation of dine-in and delivery service.
5.4. Caveats
When using failure rates as a dependent variable, the
beneﬁts of a ﬁrm’s experience are not always easy to
distinguish from those of reputation and brand recog-
nition. Much like experience, reputation builds up
over time and may be localized. Using a cost-based
dependent variable is one strategy to isolate the expe-
rience effect (e.g., Darr et al. 1995), but no such data
are available for our population. Alternatively, test-
ing the effects of the presence of a common business
name across multiple units within a chain can distin-
guish these effects (e.g., Ingram and Baum 1997). In
our case, all of the franchisors use the same name at
all afﬁliated units, making such a distinction impos-
sible for that group. Further, more than 80% of the
franchisor-unafﬁliated multiunit owners in our sam-
ple do business under the same name at all their units.
However, we are conﬁdent that at least a substantial
proportion of our results capture knowledge-based
beneﬁts of congenital experience. While we acknowl-
edge that “congenital reputation” is likely to be ben-
eﬁcial at the time of a unit’s founding, it should not
be as discontinuously important as congenital experi-
ence. First, as noted earlier, congenital experience can
provide crucial insight for irreversible decisions such
as site selection that will greatly affect the likelihood
of a unit’s failure. A poor reputation is unlikely to be
as irreversible as a poor location decision. Second, we
note that our franchised subpopulation largely con-
sists of well-established chains such as Pizza Hut and
Domino’s, whose brand names and reputations were
ﬁrmly implanted in the nation’s consciousness well
before the 1990s, our period of observation. Third,
reputation or brand recognition would be unlikely
to generate the complementary effect between the
owner’s and franchisor’s local congenital experiences.
6. Discussion
This paper has presented robust evidence that the
locally accumulated congenital experience of owners
inhibits failure of their units. This result holds for
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units both unafﬁliated and afﬁliated with franchisors,
including the case where the franchisors themselves
own the units. Our results are consistent with the
notion that congenital experience is crucial because
it informs the many irreversible decisions made at a
unit’s startup, in particular, the actual location deci-
sion for the unit.
The coefﬁcients for owners’ local congenital expe-
rience are similar in magnitude for units afﬁliated
with franchised chains and those unafﬁliated, indi-
cating that an owner’s experience in the local area
is just as important within franchised chains as out-
side them. This ﬁnding may seem surprising from the
point of view of some of the practitioner literature,
because the franchisors often claim that their experi-
ence serves as a substitute for owners’ own experi-
ence (see, e.g., Luxenberg 1985, pp. 19, 36). Yet when
we consider past ﬁndings that crucial knowledge pos-
sessed by franchisee owners and their employees is
tacit in nature (Argote and Darr 2001), our results not
only make sense but also strengthen the notion that
tacit knowledge is vital for success, even within the
franchised chains that rely so much on codiﬁcation.
Further supporting the idea of the importance of
tacit knowledge within franchise systems is our ﬁnd-
ing that franchisees beneﬁt from the local, but not
distant, congenital experience of the other owners
afﬁliated with the same franchisor. We had hypothe-
sized that, because knowledge from other franchisees
typically disseminates to a unit via the franchisor
(Argote 1999, p. 91) and that because the franchisors
strive to codify knowledge (e.g., Love 1986, p. 140),
the experience accumulated throughout the fran-
chisor’s chain would be beneﬁcial to a unit whether it
was accumulated locally or distantly. Our results are
inconsistent with this hypothesis, even showing occa-
sional failure-increasing effects of distantly gained
experience.
The localized nature of our ﬁndings suggests that
the real value of the local congenital experience accu-
mulated at the same franchisor’s other units may
come indirectly from the other franchisees, possibly
via the franchisors’ district managers. While fran-
chisees may not directly help a different franchisee’s
ﬂedgling unit for fear of encroachment and future
competition, the franchisor’s district managers may
receive this knowledge, add some of their own local
and tacit experience, and transmit this knowledge to
an owner of a future unit. This knowledge may allow
the owner to make informed decisions regarding site
selection and other startup activities.
We also found that the local congenital experi-
ence of franchisees and that of other owners afﬁli-
ated with the same franchisor act as complements:
A franchisee’s local congenital experience reduces
unit failure more when the chain’s other owners also
have local congenital experience. This complementar-
ity is theoretically interesting, as it indicates that an
owner’s local experience provides absorptive capac-
ity, the underlying knowledge needed to assimilate
external knowledge. Similar to ﬁrms needing to con-
duct their own R&D to understand inventions cre-
ated elsewhere (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), one’s
own local experience may be required to understand
and interpret knowledge created by similar others.
Interestingly, from our supplementary analysis, the
company-owned units of the franchisor gain from no
such complementarity, suggesting that the franchisor
does not incorporate the local experience of the fran-
chisees into their decision making regarding their new
units. This ﬁnding suggests that high-powered incen-
tives, along with a nonhierarchical organization struc-
ture, need to be in place for the units of the chain to
take advantage of tacit knowledge possessed within
the organization.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented robust evidence
that the retail and service units of multiunit owners,
whether afﬁliated with franchisors or not, beneﬁted
from their owner’s local congenital experience. Units
did not beneﬁt from distantly gained experience. Fur-
ther, local experience of other owners afﬁliated with
the same franchisor reduced failure rates of units, just
like their own multiunit owners’ experience. Contrary
to our hypothesis, franchisors’ distant experience did
not prove beneﬁcial. Finally, among units afﬁliated
with franchisors, a complementary effect was found
for owner and franchisor congenital experience.
While local knowledge has long been considered
valuable at a country level (e.g., Caves 1971), orga-
nizational research has only recently begun to dis-
cover the beneﬁts of local knowledge at a more
microgeographic level (Baum and Ingram 1997, Greve
1999). The results here strengthen the case for the
importance of local knowledge at the microlevel of
cities and towns, not just at a national or regional
level. Even in franchised industries—where codiﬁca-
tion and standardization are at the core of competitive
advantage—and even in an era of inexpensive trans-
portation and almost costless global communication,
tacit knowledge localized in nature and difﬁcult to
transmit to distant sites still appears to play a primary
role in business success.
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